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HICK'S RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND
"REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY":
A MIDDLE GROUND
David Basinger

The purpose of this discussion is to analyze comparatively the influential argument for
religious pluralism offered by John Hick and the argument for religious exclusivism
(sectarianism) which can be generated by proponents of what has come to be labeled
'Reformed Epistemology.' I argue that while Hick and the Reformed exclusivist appear to
be giving us incompatible responses to the same question about the true nature of 'religious'
reality, they are actually responding to related, but distinct questions, each of which must
be considered by those desiring to give a religious explanation for the phenomenon of
religious diversity. Moreover, I conclude that the insights of neither ought to be emphasized
at the expense of the other.

No one denies that the basic tenets of many religious perspectives are, if taken
literally, quite incompatible. The salvific claims of some forms of Judeo-Christian
thought, for example, condemn the proponents of all other perspectives to hell,
while the incompatible salvific claims of some forms ofIslamic thought do the same.
Such incompatibility is normally explained in one of three basic ways. The nontheist argues that all religious claims are false, the product perhaps of wish fulfillment. The religious pluralist argues that the basic claims of at least all ofthe major
world religions are more or less accurate descriptions of the same reality. Finally,
the religious exclusivist argues that the tenets of only one religion (or some limited
number of religions) are to any significant degree accurate descriptions of reality. I
The purpose of this discussion is to analyze comparatively the influential argument for religious pluralism offered by John Hick and the argument for religious
exclusivism which can be (and perhaps has been) generated by proponents of what
has come to be labeled 'Reformed Epistemology.' I shall argue that while Hick
and the Reformed epistemologist appear to be giving us incompatible responses
to the same question about the true nature of 'religious' reality, they are actually
responding to related, but distinct questions, each of which must be considered by
those desiring to give a religious explanation for the phenomenon of religious diversity. Moreover, I shall conclude that the insights offered by both Hick and the
Reformed epistemologist are of value and, accordingly, that those of neither ought
to be emphasized at the expense of the other.
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Faith and Philosophy
John Hick's Theological Pluralism

Hick's contention is not that different religions make no conflicting truth
claims. In fact, he believes that "the differences of belief between (and within)
the traditions are legion," and has often in great detail discussed them. 2 His basic
claim, rather, is that such differences are best seen as "different ways of conceiving and experiencing the one ultimate divine Reality. "3
However, if the various religions are really "responses to a single ultimate
transcendent Reality," how then do we account for such significant differences?4
The best explanation, we are told, is the assumption that "the limitless divine
reality has been thought and experienced by different human mentalities forming
and formed by different intellectual frameworks and devotional techniques."5
Or, as Hick has stated the point elsewhere, the best explanation is the assumption
that the correspondingly different ways of responding to divine reality "owe their
differences to the modes of thinking, perceiving and feeling which have developed
within the different patterns of human existence embodied in the various cultures
of the earth." Each "constitutes a valid context of salvation/liberation; but none
constitutes the one and only such context."6
But why accept such a pluralistic explanation? Why not hold, rather, that there
is no higher Reality beyond us and thus that all religious claims are false-i.e.,
why not opt for naturalism? Or why not adopt the exclusivistic contention that
the religious claims of only one perspective are true?
Hick does not reject naturalism because he sees it to be an untenable position.
It is certainly possible, he tells us, that the "entire realm of [religious] experience
is delusory or hallucinatory, simply a human projection, and not in any way or
degree a result of the presence of a greater divine reality."7 In fact, since the
"universe of which we are part is religiously ambiguous," it is not even unreasonable or implausible "to interpret any aspect of it, including our religious experience, in non-religious as well as religious ways."8
However, he is quick to add, "it is perfectly reasonable and sane for us to
trust our experience"-including our religious experience-"as generally cognitive of reality except when we have some reason to doubt it."9 Moreover, "the
mere theoretical possibility that any or all [religious experience] may be illusory
does not count as a reason to doubt it." Nor is religious experience overturned
by the fact that the great religious figures of the past, including Jesus, held a
number of beliefs which we today reject as arising from the now outmoded
science of their day, or by the fact that some people find "it impossible to accept
that the profound dimension of pain and suffering is the measure of the cost of
creation through creaturely freedom."10
He acknowledges that those who have "no positive ground for religious belief
within their own experience" often do see such factors as "insuperable barriers"
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to religious belief. II But given the ambiguous nature of the evidence, he argues, it
cannot be demonstrated that all rational people must see it this way. That is, belief
in a supernatural realm can't be shown to be any less plausible than disbelief.
Accordingly, he concludes, "those who actually participate in this field of religious
experience are fully entitled, as sane and rational persons, to take the risk of trusting
their own experience together with that of their tradition, and of proceeding to live
and to believe on the basis of it, rather than taking the alternative risk of distrusting
it and so-for the time being at least-turning their backs on God."12
But why choose pluralism as the best religious hypothesis? Why does Hick
believe we ought not be excIusivists? It is not because he sees exclusivism as
incoherent. It is certainly possible, he grants, that "one particular 'Ptolomaic'
religious vision does correspond uniquely with how things are."13 Nor does Hick
claim to have some privileged "cosmic vantage point from which [he can] observe
both the divine reality in itself and the different partial human awarenesses of
that reality."14 But when we individually consider the evidence in the case, he
argues, the result is less ambiguous. When "we start from the phenomenological
fact of the various forms of religious experience, and we seek an hypothesis
which will make sense of this realm of phenomena" from a religious point of
view, "the theory that most naturally suggests itself postulates a divine Reality
which is itself limitless, exceeding the scope of human conceptuality and language, but which is humanly thought and experienced in various conditioned
and limited ways.""
What is this evidence which makes the pluralistic hypothesis so "considerably
more probable" than exclusivism? For one thing, Hick informs us, a credible
religious hypothesis must account for the fact, "evident to ordinary people (even
though not always taken into account by theologians) that in the great majority
of cases-say 98 to 99 percent-the religion in which a person believes and to
which he adheres depends upon where he was born."16 Moreover, a credible
hypothesis must account for the fact that within all of the major religious traditions, "basically the same salvific process is taking place, namely the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. "17 And
while pluralism "illuminates" these otherwise baffling facts, the strict excIusivist' s
view "has come to seem increasingly implausible and unrealistic. "18
But even more importantly, he maintains, a credible religious hypothesis must
account for the fact, of which "we have become irreversibly aware in the present
century, as the result of anthropological, sociological and psychological studies
and the work philosophy of language, that there is no one universal and invariable"
pattern for interpreting human experience, but rather a range of significantly
different patterns or conceptual schemes "which have developed within the major
cultural streams." And when considered in light of this, Hick concludes, a
"pluralistic theory becomes inevitable." 19
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The Reformed Objection

There are two basic ways in which Hick's pluralistic position can be critiqued.
One "appropriate critical response," according to Hick himself, "would be to
offer a better [religious] hypothesis."20 That is, one way to challenge Hick is to
claim that the evidence he cites is better explained by some form of exclusivism.
But there is another, potentially more powerful type of objection, one which
finds its roots in the currently popular 'Reformed Epistemology' being championed by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga. I will first briefly outline Plantinga's latest version of this epistemological approach and then discuss its impact
on Hick's position.
According to Plantinga, it has been widely held since the Enlightenment that
if theistic beliefs~.g., religious hypotheses-are to be considered rational, they
must be based on propositional evidence. It is not enough for the theist just to
refute objections to any such belief. The theist "must also have something like
an argument for the belief, or some positive reason to think that the belief is
true. "21 But this is incorrect, Plantinga maintains. There are beliefs which acquire
their warrant propositionally-i.e., have warrant conferred on them by an evidential line of reasoning from other beliefs. And for such beliefs, it may well be
true that proponents need something like an argument for their veridicality.
However, there are also, he tells us, basic beliefs which are not based on
propositional evidence and, thus, do not require propositional warrant. In fact,
if such beliefs can be affirmed "without either violating an epistemic duty or
displaying some kind of noetic defect," they can be considered properly basic. 22
And, according to Plantinga, many theistic beliefs can be properly basic: "Under
widely realized conditions it is perfectly rational, reasonable, intellectually
respectable and acceptable to believe [certain theistic tenets] without believing
[them] on the basis of [propositional] evidence."23
But what are such conditions? Under what conditions can a belief have positive
epistemic status if it is not conferred by other propositions whose epistemic status
is not in question? The answer, Plantinga informs us, lies in an analysis of belief
formation.
[We have] cognitive faculties designed to enable us to achieve true
beliefs with respect to a wide variety of propositions-propositions
about our immediate environment, about our interior lives, about the
thoughts and experiences of other persons, about our universe at large,
about right and wrong, about the whole realm of abstracta-numbers,
properties, propositions, states of affairs, possible worlds and their like,
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about modality-what is necessary and possible-and about [ourselves].
These faculties work in such a way that under the appropriate circumstances we form the appropriate belief. More exactly, the appropriate
belief is formed in us; in the typical case we do not decide to hold or
form the belief in question, but simply find ourselves with it. Upon
considering an instance of modus ponens, I find myself believing its
corresponding conditional; upon being appeared to in the familiar way,
I find myself holding the belief that there is a large tree before me;
upon being asked what I had for breakfast, I reflect for a moment and
find myself with the belief that what I had was eggs on toast. In these
and other cases I do not decide what to believe; I don't total up the
evidence (I'm being appeared to redly; on most occasions when thus
appeared to I am in the presence of something red, so most probably
in this case I am) and make a decision as to what seems best supported;
I simply find myself believing. 24
And from a theistic point of view, Plantinga continues, the same is true in
the religious realm. Just as it is true that when our senses or memory is functioning
properly, "appropriate belief is formed in us," so it is that God has created us
with faculties which will, "when they are working the way they were designed
to work by the being who designed and created us and them," produce true
theistic beliefs. 25 Moreover, if these faculties are functioning properly, a basic
belief thus formed has "positive epistemic status to the degree [the individual in
question finds herself] inclined to accept it. "26
What, though, of the alleged counter-evidence to such theistic beliefs? What,
for example, of all the arguments the conclusion of which is that God does not
exist? Can they all be dismissed as irrelevant? Not immediately, answers Plantinga. We must seriously consider potential defeaters of our basic beliefs. With
respect to the belief that God exists, for example, we must seriously consider
the claim that religious belief is mere wish fulfillment and the claim that God's
existence is incompatible with (or at least improbable given) the amount of evil
in the world.
But to undercut such defeaters, he continues, we need not engage in positive
apologetics: produce propositional evidence for our beliefs. We need only engage
in negative apologetics: refute such arguments. 27 Moreover, it is Plantinga's
conviction that such defeaters do normally exist. "The nonpropositional warrant
enjoyed by [a person's] belief in God, for example, [seems] itself sufficient to
tum back the challenge offered by some alleged defeaters"-e.g., the claim that
theistic belief is mere wish fulfillment. And other defeaters such as the "problem
of evil" he tells us, can be undercut by identifying validity or soundness problems
or even by appealing to the fact that "experts think it unsound or that the experts
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are evenly divided as to its soundness. "28
Thus, not surprisingly, he concludes that, even considering all the alleged
counter-evidence, there is little reason to believe that many theistic beliefs cannot
be considered properly basic for most adult theists--even intellectually sophisticated adult theists.
Do Plantinga or other proponents of this Reformed epistemology maintain that
their exclusivistic religious hypotheses are properly basic and can thus be 'defended' in the manner just outlined? I am not certain that they do. However,
when Plantinga, for example, claims that "God exists" is for most adult theists
properly basic, he appears to have in mind a classical Christian conception of
the divine-i.e., a being who is the triune, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly
good, ex nihilo creator of the universe. In fact, given his recent claim that "the
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit ... is a source of reliable and perfectly
acceptable beliefs about what is communicated [by God] in Scripture," and the
manner in which most who make such a claim view the truth claims of the other
world religions, it would appear that Plantinga's 'basic' conception of God is
quite exclusive. 29
However, even if no Reformed epistemologist actually does affirm an
exclusivistic hypothesis she claims is properly basic, it is obvious that the
Reformed analysis of belief justification can be used to critique Hick's line of
reasoning. Hick claims that an objective inductive assessment of the relevant
evidence makes his pluralistic thesis a more plausible religious explanation than
any of the competing exclusivistic hypotheses. But a Reformed exclusivist could
easily argue that this approach to the issue is misguided. My affirmation of an
exclusivistic Christian perspective, such an argument might begin, is not evidential in nature. It is, rather, simply a belief I have found formed in me, much
like the belief that I am seeing a tree in front of me or the belief that killing
innocent children is wrong.
Now, of course, I must seriously consider the allegedly formidable defeaters
with which pluralists such as Hick have presented me. I must consider the fact,
for example, that the exclusive beliefs simply formed in most people are not
similar to mine, but rather tend to mirror those beliefs found in the cultures in
which such people have been raised. But I do not agree with Hick that this fact
is best explained by a pluralistic hypothesis. I attribute this phenomenon to other
factors such as the epistemic blindness with which much of humanity has been
plagued since the fall. 30
Moreover, to defend my position-to maintain justifiably (rationally) that I
am right and Hick is wrong-I need not, as Hick seems to suggest, produce
objective 'proof' that his hypothesis is weaker than mine. That is, I need not
produce 'evidence' that would lead most rational people to agree with me. That
would be to involve myself in Classical Foundationalism, which is increasingly
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being recognized as a bankrupt epistemological methodology. All I need do is
undercut Hick's defeaters-i.e., show that his challenge does not require me to
abandon my exclusivity thesis. And this I can easily do. For Hick has not
demonstrated that my thesis is self-contradictory. And it is extremely doubtful
that there exists any other nonquestion-begging criterion for plausibility by which
he could even attempt to demonstrate that my thesis is less plausible (less probable)
than his.
Hick, of course, believes firmly that his hypothesis makes the most sense.
But why should this bother me? By his own admission, many individuals firmly
believe that, given the amount of seemingly gratuitous evil in the world, God's
nonexistence is by far most plausible. Yet this does not keep him from affirming
theism. He simply reserves the right to see things differently and continues to
believe. And there is no reason why I cannot do the same.
Moreover, even if what others believed were relevant, by Hick's own admission, the majority of theists doubt that his thesis is true. 31 Or, at the very least,
I could rightly maintain that "the experts are evenly divided as to its soundness."
Thus, given the criteria for defeater assessment which we Reformed exclusivists
affirm, Hick's defeaters are clearly undercut. And, accordingly, I remain perfectly
justified in continuing to hold that my exclusivity thesis is correct and, therefore,
that all incompatible competing hypotheses are false.
A Middle Ground
It is tempting to see Hick and the Reformed exclusivist as espousing incompatible approaches to the question of religious diversity. If Hick is correct-if the
issue is primarily evidential in nature-then the Reformed exclusivist is misguided
and vice versa. But this, I believe, is an inaccurate assessment of the situation.
There are two equally important, but distinct, questions which arise in this
context, and Hick and the Reformed exclusivist, it seems to me, each primarily
address only one.
The Reformed exclusivist is primarily interested in the following question:

Ql: Under what conditions is an individual within her epistemic rights
(is she rational) in affirming one of the many mutually exclusive
religious diversity hypotheses?
In response, as we have seen, the Reformed exclusivist argues (or at least
could argue) that a person need not grant that her religious hypothesis (belief)
requires propositional (evidential) warrant. She is within her epistemic rights in
maintaining that it is a basic belief. And if she does so, then to preserve rationality,
she is not required to 'prove' in some objective manner that her hypothesis is
most plausible. She is fulfilling all epistemic requirements solely by defending
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her hypothesis against claims that it is less plausible than competitors.
It seems to me that the Reformed exclusivist is basically right on this point.
I do believe, for reasons mentioned later in this essay, that attempts by any
knowledgeable exclusivist to defend her hypothesis will ultimately require her
to enter the realm of positive apologetics-i.e., will require her to engage in a
comparative analysis of her exclusivistic beliefs. But I wholeheartedly agree
with the Reformed exclusivist's contention that to preserve rationality, she need
not actually demonstrate that her hypothesis is most plausible. She need ultimately
only defend herself against the claim that a thoughtful assessment of the matter
makes the affirmation of some incompatible perspective-i.e., pluralism or some
incompatible exclusivistic perspective-the only rational option. And this, I
believe, she can clearly do.
What this means, of course, is that if Hick is actually arguing that pluralism
is the only rational option, then I think he is wrong. And his claim that pluralism
"is considerably more probable" than exclusivism does, it must be granted, make
it appear as if he believes pluralism to be the only hypothesis a knowledgeable
theist can justifiably affirm.
But Hick never actually calls his opponents irrational in this context. That is,
while Hick clearly believes that sincere, knowledgeable exclusivists are wrong,
he has never to my knowledge claimed that they are guilty of violating the basic
epistemic rules governing rational belief. Accordingly, it seems best to assume
that QI-a concern with what can be rationally affirmed-is not Hick's primary
interest in this context.
But what then is it with which Hick is concerned? As we have seen, QI is
defensive in nature. It asks for identification of conditions under which we can
justifiably continue to affirm a belief we already hold. But why hold the specific
religious beliefs we desire to defend? Why, specifically, choose to defend
religious pluralism rather than exclusivism or vice versa? Or, to state this question
of 'belief origin' more formally:
Q2: Given that an individual can be within her epistemic rights (can be
rational) in affirming either exclusivism or pluralism, upon what
basis should her actual choice be made?
This is the type of question in which I believe Hick is primarily interested.
Now, it might be tempting for a Reformed exclusivist to contend that she is
exempt from the consideration of Q2. As I see it, she might begin, this question
is based on the assumption that individuals consciously choose their religious
belief systems. But the exclusivistic hypothesis which I affirm was not the result
of a conscious attempt to choose the most plausible option. I have simply discovered this exclusivistic hypothesis formed in me in much the same fashion I
find my visual and moral beliefs just formed in me. And thus Hick's question
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is simply irrelevant to my position.
But such a response will not do. There is no reason to deny that Reformed
exclusivists do have, let's say, a Calvinistic religious hypothesis just formed in
them. However, although almost everyone in every culture does in the appropriate
context have similar 'tree-beliefs' just formed in them, there is no such unanimity
within the religious realm. As Hick rightly points out, the religious belief that
the overwhelming majority of people in any given culture find just formed in
them is the dominant hypothesis of that culture or subculture. Moreover, the
dominant religious hypotheses in most of these cultures are exclusivistic-i.e.,
incompatible with one another.
Accordingly, it seems to me that Hick can rightly be interpreted as offering
the following challenge to the knowledgeable Reformed exclusivist (the
exclusivist aware of pervasive religious diversity): I will grant that your
exclusivistic beliefs were not originally the product of conscious deliberation.
But given that most sincere theists initially go through a type of religious beliefforming process similar to yours and yet usually find formed in themselves the
dominant exclusivistic hypotheses of their own culture, upon what basis can you
justifiably continue to claim that the hypothesis you affirm has some special
status just because you found it formed in you? Or, to state the question somewhat
differently, Hick's analysis of religious diversity challenges knowledgeable
Reformed exclusivists to ask themselves why they now believe that their religious
belief-forming mechanisms are functioning properly while the analogous
mechanisms in all others are faulty.
Some Reformed exclusivists, as we have seen, have a ready response. Because
of 'the fall,' they maintain, most individuals suffer from religious epistemic
blindness-i.e., do not possess properly functioning religious belief-forming
mechanisms. Only our mechanisms are trustworthy. However, every exclusivistic
religious tradition can-and many do-make such claims. Hence, an analogous
Hickian question again faces knowledgeable Reformed exclusivists: Why do you
believe that only those religious belief-forming mechanisms which produce exc1usivistic beliefs compatible with yours do not suffer from epistemic blindness?
Reformed exclusivists cannot at this point argue that they have found this
belief just formed in them for it is now the reliability of the belief-forming
mechanism, itself, which is being questioned. Nor, since they are anti-foundationalists, can Reformed exclusivists argue that the evidence demonstrates
conclusively that their position is correct. So upon what then can they base their
crucial belief that their religious belief-forming mechanisms alone produce true
beliefs?
They must, it seems to me, ultimately fall back on the contention that their
belief-forming mechanisms can alone be trusted because that set of beliefs thus
generated appears to them to form the most plausible religious explanatory
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hypothesis available. But to respond in this fashion brings them into basic
methodological agreement with Hick's position on Q2. That is, it appears that
knowledgeable Reformed exclusivists must ultimately maintain with Hick that
when attempting to discover which of the many self-consistent hypotheses that
can rationally be affirmed is the one that ought to be affirmed, a person must
finally decide which hypothesis she believes best explains the phenomena. Or,
to state this important point differently yet, what Hick's analysis of religious
diversity demonstrates, I believe, is that even for those knowledgeable Reformed
exclusivists who claim to find their religious perspectives just formed in them,
a conscious choice among competing religious hypotheses is ultimately called for.
This is not to say, it must again be emphasized, that such Reformed exclusivists
must attempt to 'prove' their choice is best. But, given the culturally relative
nature of religious belief-forming mechanisms, a simple appeal to such a
mechanism seems inadequate as a basis for such exclusivists to continue to affirm
their perspective. It seems rather that knowledgeable exclusivists must ultimately
make a conscious decision whether to retain the religious hypothesis that has
been formed in them or choose another. And it further appears that they should
feel some prima facie obligation to consider the available options--consciously
consider the nature of the various religious hypotheses formed in people-before
doing so.
Now, of course, to agree that such a comparative analysis should be undertaken
is not to say that Hick's pluralistic hypothesis is, in fact, the most plausible
alternative. I agree with the Reformed exclusivist that 'plausibility' is a very
subjective concept. Thus, I doubt that the serious consideration of the competing
explanatory hypotheses for religious phenomena, even by knowledgeable, openminded individuals, will produce consensus.
However, I do not see this as in any sense diminishing the importance of
engaging in the type of comparative analysis suggested. For even if such comparative assessment will not lead to consensus, it will produce two significant
benefits. First, only by such assessment, I feel, can a person acquire 'ownership'
of her religious hypothesis. That is, only by such an assessment can she insure
herself that her belief is not solely the product of environmental conditioning.
Second, such an assessment should lead all concerned to be more tolerant of
those with which they ultimately disagree. And in an age where radical religious
exclusivism again threatens world peace, I believe such tolerance to be of inestimable value.
This does not mean, let me again emphasize in closing, that the consideration
of Q I-the consideration of the conditions under which a religious hypothesis
can be rationally affirmed-is unimportant or even less important than the consideration of Q2. It is crucial that we recognize who must actually shoulder the
'burden of proof' in this context. And we need to thank Reformed exclusivists

HICK'S REliGIOUS PLURAliSM

431

for helping us think more clearly about this matter. But I fear that a preoccupation
with Q 1 can keep us from seeing the importance of Q2-the consideration of
the basis upon which we choose the hypothesis to be defended-and the comparative assessment of hypotheses to which such consideration leads us. And we
need to thank pluralists such as Hick for drawing our attention to this fact.
Roberts Wesleyan College
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